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A modified four-state CVQKD protocol is proposed to increase the maximum transmission distance and
tolerable excess noise in the presence of Gaussian lossy and noisy channel by using a noiseless linear amplifier
(NLA). We show that a NLA with gain g can increase the maximum admission losses by 20 log10 g dB.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a means of shar-
ing a secret key between two parties (Alice and Bob) se-
curely in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve) [1, 2]. The
single-photon (e. g. BB84 [3]), entanglement-based (e. g.
E91 [4]) and continuous variable (e. g. GG02 [5]) QKD
protocols have proved to be unconditionally secure under
some (e. g. source, detection, and post-processing) assump-
tions [1]. In the continuous-variable QKD (CVQKD) pro-
tocols, information is encoded in quadratures of coherent or
squeezed states, and decoded by homodyne or heterodyne de-
tections [5–8], which have the advantage of only requiring
off-the-shelf telecom components [9]. Besides experimental
demonstrations [10, 11], the theoretical security of CVQKD
has been established against general collective Gaussian at-
tacks [12–15], which has been shown optimal in the asymp-
totical limit [16]. Furthermore, the effect of finite size has
been recently investigated in CVQKD protocol [17–19].
Developing QKD protocol resistant to loss and noise is of
great practical importance. The CVQKD protocol based on
Gaussian modulation of coherent state has been proven to be
technically practical [9]. However, due to the low reconcili-
ation efficiency for correlated Gaussian variables at low SNR
(signal to noise ration), the maximum transmission distance of
CVQKD is quite limited [11]. There are two possible ways to
solve this problem. One is to build good reconciliation algo-
rithms with reasonable efficiency even at low SNR for Gaus-
sian modulation protocols, where steady progress has been
made in recent years [20]. The other is to use discrete modula-
tion CVQKD [21–24], such as the four-state protocol [22, 23],
which has been proved to be secure against collective attacks
and have large enough reconciliation efficiency at low SNR.
Recently, it is very interesting to see that one can improve
the maximum transmission distance of Gaussian modulation
CVQKD protocols dramatically by using a nondeterministic
noiseless linear amplifier (NLA) [25]. Lately, a method was
proposed to improve the secret key rate of four-state CVQKD
protocol over long distance by using a phase-sensitive or
phase-insensitive optical amplifier, while the maximum trans-
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mission distance is decreased [26]. Inspired by the methods
in [25], we show that the maximum transmission distance and
tolerable excess noise of the four-state CVQKD protocol can
be increased by using a NLA before Bob’s detection in the
presence of a lossy and noisy Gaussian channel. Similar to the
result in [25], we find that a NLA with gain g can increase the
maximum admissible losses by a factor of g−2. Because of the
nondeterministic nature of the NLA, the security proof here is
similar to that in CVQKD protocols with post-selection.
II. THE FOUR-STATE CVQKD PROTOCOL
In this section, we firstly describe the prepare-and-measure
(PM) and entanglement-based (EB) version of the four-state
CVQKD protocol. Then, the secure key rate for the protocol
under collective attack is given in detail.
A. The PM and EB description of four-state CVQKD protocol
In the PM version of the four-state CVQKD proto-
col [22], Alice sends randomly one of the four coherent
states
{
|αk〉 =
∣∣∣αeiπ(2k+1)/4〉 , k = 0, 1, 2, 3} with probability 1/4
to Bob through a quantum channel, where α is chosen to be
a real positive number. Bob measures randomly one of the
quadratures in homodyne detection, and decodes the informa-
tion by the sign of his measurement result.
The PM version of the four-state CVQKD protocol can be
reformulated in EB version. Alice initially prepare a two-
mode entangled state
|ΦAB(α)〉 = 12
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉A
∣∣∣αei(2k+1)π/4〉
B
, (1)
where
|ψk〉 =
1
2
3∑
m=0
ei(1+2k)mπ/4 |φm〉 (k = 0, 1, 2, 3) (2)
2is a non-Gaussian orthogonal state, and
|φk〉 =
e−α
2/2
√
λk
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n α
4n+k
√(4n + k)! |4n + k〉 ,
λ0,2 =
1
2
e−α
2 [cosh(α2) ± cos(α2)],
λ1,3 =
1
2
e−α
2 [sinh(α2) ± sin(α2)].
Then Alice performs a projective measurement {|ψ0〉 〈ψ0|,
|ψ1〉 〈ψ1|, |ψ2〉 〈ψ2|, |ψ3〉 〈ψ3|} on mode A to project mode B on
one of the four coherent states |αk〉 (k = 0, 1, 2, 3) randomly,
which are then measured by a homodyne detector at Bob’s
side after passing through a quantum channel.
Although the EB version does not correspond to the actual
implementation, it is fully equivalent to the PM version from
the a secure point of view [22, 23], and it provides a power-
ful description of establishing security proof against collective
attacks through the covariance matrix γAB of the state before
their respective measurements [25, 26].
B. Secure key rate of four-state CVQKD protocol
The covariance matrix γA0 B0 of the state |ΦAB(α)〉 is
γA0B0 =
[
VI Zσz
Zσz VI
]
, (3)
where I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
and σz =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, V = 2α2 + 1 = VA + 1
is variance of quadratures for mode A and B, and
Z = 2α2(λ3/20 λ−1/21 + λ3/21 λ−1/22 + λ3/22 λ−1/23 + λ3/23 λ−1/20 ) (4)
reflects the correlation between mode A and mode B. After
mode B passing through a Gaussian channel with transmit-
tance T and equivalent excess noise at the input ǫ, the quan-
tum state |ΦAB(α)〉 turns to state ρAB with covariance matrix
γAB(α, T, ǫ) =
[
VI
√
TZσz√
TZσz T (V + χ)I
]
, (5)
where χ = T1−T + ǫ is the equivalent total noise at the in-
put. This matrix contains all the information needed to estab-
lish the secret key rate for collective attacks for the four-state
CVQKD protocol, and the lower bound of secure key rate with
reverse reconciliation is [22]
R(α, T, ǫ) ≥ βIAB(α, T, ǫ) − S BE(α, T, ǫ), (6)
where
IAB(α, T, ǫ) = 12 log2(
V + χ
1 + χ
) = 1
2
log2(1 + SNR) (7)
refers here to the mutual information between Alice and
Bob [26], S BE is the Holevo bound for the mutual informa-
tion shared by Eve and Bob, and β < 1 is the reconciliation
efficiency (β > 0.8 can be reached for arbitrary low SNR in
the four-state CVQKD protocol [22, 23]). As shown in [22],
S BE is maximized when the state ρAB shared by Alice and
Bob is a Gaussian state, which means S BE is upper bounded
by the same quantity computed for a Gaussian state ρGAB with
the same covariance matrix as the state ρAB in an EB version
of the protocol [23]. Clearly, one has
S BE ≤ S GBE = G
(
v1 − 1
2
)
+G
(
v2 − 1
2
)
−G
(
v3 − 1
2
)
, (8)
where G(x) = (x + 1) log2(1 + x) + x log2 x, and
v1,2 =
√
1
2
(∆ ±
√
∆2 − 4D) (9)
are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix γAB
where ∆ = V2 + T 2(V + χ)2 − 2TZ2 and D = (TV2 + TVχ −
TZ2)2 [23, 26], and
v3 =
√
V(VA + 1 − TZ
2
TVA + 1 + T ǫ
). (10)
is the symplectic eigenvalues of γA|B which corresponds to the
covariance matrix of Alice’s state given the result of Bob’s ho-
modyne measurement [23]. Finally, the lower bound of secure
key rate is
R(α, T, ǫ) = βIAB(α, T, ǫ) − S GBE(α, T, ǫ) ≤ R(α, T, ǫ). (11)
III. MODIFIED FOUR-STATE CVQKD PROTOCOL BY
USING A NLA
Inspired by the method in [25], we propose a modified
four-state CVQKD protocol by using a NLA as shown in
Fig. 1(a), where Alice and Bob implement the original four-
state CVQKD protocol as usual but Bob adds a NLA before
his homodyne detection, which is here assumed to be perfect
for simplify of analysis as in [25].
A NLA can in principle probabilistic amplify the ampli-
tude of a coherent state while retaining the initial level of
noise [27–31]. The successful amplification can be described
by an operator ˆC = gnˆ, where nˆ is the photon number operator.
When a NLA succeeds amplifying a coherent state,
ˆC |α〉 = e |α|
2
2 (g2−1) |gα〉 , (12)
where g is the amplitude gain of a NLA. In the modified four-
state CVQKD protocol, only the events corresponding to a
successful amplification will be used to exact a secret key,
while the other events are aborted. Since the secure key rate of
the protocol depends only on the covariance matrix γAB, it is
sufficient to compute it in presence of the NLA to estimate the
lower bound of secure key rate Rg(α, T, ǫ, g) corresponding to
successfully amplified events.
In the following, we will analysis the performance of the
modified four-state CVQKD protocol in two cases: (I) a lossy
Gaussian channel without excess, where one can see directly
the effect of the NLA; (II) a lossy and noisy Gaussian channel,
which is a general and practical case.
3A. Case I: Lossy Gaussian channel without excess noise (ǫ = 0)
After mode B passing through a lossy Gaussian channel
with transmittance T and no excess noise (ǫ = 0), the state
|ΦAB〉 turns to
∣∣∣Φ′AB〉 = 12 ∑3k=0 |ψk〉 ∣∣∣√Tαk〉 with covariance
matrix
γAB(α, T, ǫ = 0) =
[
VI
√
TZσz√
TZσz T (V + 1−TT )I
]
. (13)
Then a NLA with gain g is added to amplify the input state at
Bob’s side on mode B, which can be described by the operator
gnˆ when the input state is successfully amplified. One can
easily derive that
gnˆ
∣∣∣Φ′AB〉 = 12 e T2 |α|2(g2−1)
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉
∣∣∣∣g√Tαk〉. (14)
After the normalization of the output state, the successfully
amplified quantum state is
∣∣∣Φ′′AB〉 = 12 ∑3k=0 |ψk〉 ∣∣∣g√Tαk〉 with
covariance matrix
γ
g
AB(α, T, ǫ = 0) =
 VI
√
g2TZσz√
g2TZσz g2T (V + 1−g
2T
g2T )I
 . (15)
One can find that the covariance matrix γgAB(α, T, ǫ = 0) corre-
sponds to successful amplification is equal to the covariance
matrix γAB(αg = α, η = g2T, ǫg = 0) of an equivalent sys-
tem with |ΦAB(α)〉 sent through a channel with transmittance
η = g2T and excess noise ǫg = 0, without using a NLA (as
shown in Fig. 1(b)). Since the lower bound of secure key rate
under collective attacks is completely determined by the co-
variance matrix shared by Alice and Bob, the lower bound of
secret key rate Rg(α, T, ǫ = 0) corresponding to the successful
amplified events is
Rg(α, T, ǫ = 0) = R(α, g2T, ǫ = 0), (16)
FIG. 1: (color online) (a) Modified four-state CVQKD protocol and
(b) virtually equivalent protocol in EB version. A state |ΦAB(α)〉 sent
through a Gaussian channel with transmittance T and excess noise
ǫ, followed by a successful amplification, has the same covariance
matrix γAB than a state |ΦAB(αg)〉 sent through a Gaussian with trans-
mittance η and excess noise ǫg without the NLA. The lower bound
of secret key rate corresponding to successful amplified events in the
modified four-state protocol Rg(α,T, ǫ) is the same as that of the vir-
tually equivalent protocol R(αg, η, ǫg).
and the lower bound of total secure key rate is
Rgtot(α, T, ǫ) = PsuccessRg(α, T, ǫ), (17)
where Psuccess is the probability of successful amplification
by a NLA. A direct conclusion is that a NLA with ampli-
tude gain g can increase the maximum admissible losses of
the four-state CVQKD protocol by a factor g−2 without excess
noise, which is equivalent to improve the maximum transmis-
sion distance by 20 log10 g
a
km, where a = 0.2dB/km for the
fiber channel.
B. Case II: Lossy and noisy Gaussian channel (ǫ > 0)
After passing through a Gaussian channel with transmit-
tance T and excess noise ǫ, the state |ΦAB(α)〉 turns to ρAB
with covariance matrix
γAB(α, T, ǫ) =
[
VI
√
TZσz√
TZσz T (V + 1−TT + ǫ)I
]
, (18)
where the quantum state of mode B is ρB = 14 (ρ0+ρ1+ρ2+ρ3)
with variance T (V + 1−TT + ǫ).
The ρk is the state received by Bob if he knows Alice’s mea-
surement result on mode A is k, which can be described by a
displaced thermal state
ρk = D(βk)ρth(λ)D(−βk) = D(
√
Tαk)ρth(λ)D(−
√
Tαk), (19)
where ρth(λ) = (1 − λ2)∑∞n=0 λ2n |n〉 〈n| is a thermal state with
variance
V(λ) = 1 + λ
2
1 − λ2 = 1 + T ǫ (20)
corresponds to Bob’s variance when VA = 0. Then a NLA
with gain g is added to amplify the input state at Bob’s side on
mode B. Following the methods in [25], one can derive the ef-
fect of a NLA on the displaced thermal state ρk(k = 0, 1, 2, 3).
The P-function of a thermal state with parameter λ is
ρth(λ) =
∫
1 − λ2
πλ2
e
− 1−λ2
λ2
|α′ |2 ∣∣∣α′〉 〈α′∣∣∣ dα′. (21)
A displacement operation D(β) will turn a thermal state to
ρ(β) = D(β)ρth(λ)D(−β) =
∫ 1 − λ2
πλ2
e
− 1−λ2
λ2
|α′−β|2 ∣∣∣α′〉 〈α′∣∣∣ dα′
(22)
The effect of a NLA on displaced thermal state ρ(β) is
ρg(β) = ˆCρ(β) ˆC =
∫
1 − λ2
πλ2
e
− 1−λ2
λ2
|α′−β|2 gnˆ
∣∣∣α′〉 〈α′∣∣∣ gnˆdα′
=
∫
1 − λ2
πλ2
e
− 1−λ2
λ2
|α′−β|2+|α′ |2(g2−1) ∣∣∣gα′〉 〈gα′∣∣∣ dα′. (23)
By introducing u = gα′, one gets
ρg(β) =
∫
1 − λ2
g2πλ2
e
− 1−λ2
λ2
∣∣∣∣ ug−β∣∣∣∣2+|u|2 g2−1g2 |u〉 〈u| du
= C
∫
e
− 1−g2λ2
g2λ2
∣∣∣∣u−g 1−λ21−g2λ2 β
∣∣∣∣2 |u〉 〈u| du, (24)
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FIG. 2: (color online) The maximum value of the gain of NLA gmax
against the losses when ǫ = 0.02.
where C is a global unimportant normalization factor indepen-
dent of the integrated variable u. The Eq. (24) clearly corre-
spond to a thermal state ρth(gλ) displaced by g 1−λ21−g2λ2 β. Thus,
the successful amplification of ρk corresponds to a new dis-
placed thermal state ρgk ,
ρ
g
k = D(g
1 − λ2
1 − g2λ2 βk)ρth(gλ)D(−g
1 − λ2
1 − g2λ2 βk), (25)
where βk =
√
Tαk. Finally, the action of the NLA on the input
state at Bob’s side introduce the transformations
√
Tαk → g
1 − λ2
1 − g2λ2
√
Tαk, λ2 → g2λ2, (26)
which is equivalent to
√
Tαk →
2g
2 − (g2 − 1)T ǫ
√
Tαk,
T ǫ
2 + T ǫ
→ g2 T ǫ
2 + T ǫ
. (27)
In the next step, one need to consider the action of NLA
when Bob does not know Alice’s measurement result. In such
a case, the input state of the NLA is
ρB =
1
4 (ρ0 + ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3), (28)
with variance 1 + T ǫ + TVA = 1+λ
2
1−λ2 + 2Tα
2
. The output state
corresponding to successful amplified events on ρB is
ρB′ =
1
4
(
ρ
g
0 + ρ
g
1 + ρ
g
2 + ρ
g
3
)
, (29)
with variance 1+g
2λ2
1−g2λ2 + 2g
2( 1−λ21−g2λ2 )2Tα2. Thus, the action of
the NLA on the input state at Bob’s side introduce the trans-
formations
1 + λ2
1 − λ2 + 2Tα
2 → 1 + g
2λ2
1 − g2λ2 + 2g
2
(
1 − λ2
1 − g2λ2
)2
Tα2, (30)
which can be derived from Eq. (27).
Now we want to find a virtual two-mode entangled state
|ΦAB(αg)〉, sent through a channel of transmittance η and ex-
cess noise ǫg without using the NLA, while share the same
covariance matrix as γgAB(α, T, ǫ) as shown in Fig. 1(b). The
following conditions should be satisfied
√
ηαg = g
2
2 − (g2 − 1)T ǫ
√
Tα, (31)
ηǫg
2 + ηǫg
= g2
T ǫ
2 + T ǫ
, (32)
1 + ηǫg + 2ηαg2 = 1 + g
2λ2
1 − g2λ2 + 2g
2
(
1 − λ2
1 − g2λ2
)2
Tα2,(33)
where the third line can be derived by the first two lines. So,
one only need to consider the conditions in Eqs. (31) and (32).
Remind that one always has αg = α for ǫ = 0 or g = 1, so we
add a third condition
αg = α. (34)
Then the solutions for Eqs. (31), (32), and (34) is
η =
4g2T
[2 + (1 − g2)T ǫ]2 , ǫ
g
= ǫ − 1
2
(g2 − 1)T ǫ2, αg = α. (35)
Those parameters can be interpreted as physical parameters
of an equivalent system if they satisfy the physical meaning
constrains 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 and ǫg ≥ 0, which require
gmax(T, ǫ) =

1√
T
, ǫ = 0
−2
√
T+
√
4T+4Tǫ(2+Tǫ)
2Tǫ , ǫ > 0
which is plotted in Fig. 2. Finally, one has
Rg(α, T, ǫ) = R(α, η, ǫg), (36)
Rgtot(α, T, ǫ) = PsuccessRg(α, T, ǫ). (37)
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
In the following, the performance of the modified four-state
protocol is compared with the original one for a given channel
with the same transmittance T and excess noise ǫ. The se-
cure key rate of the original protocol is given by R(α, T, ǫ) in
Eq. (11), and that of modified protocol is given by Rgtot(α, T, ǫ)
in Eq. (37). In numerical simulations, Psuccess is assumed to
be a constant, which is reasonable when β < 1 [25]. The pre-
cise value of Psuccess depends on practical implementations.
However, it is not not important for our result, since it only
acts as a scaling factor of Rgtot(α, T, ǫ) and does not change the
fact that a negative secret rate R(α, T, ǫ) can become positive
Rgtot(α, T, ǫ) with a NLA for a certain distance of transmis-
sion distance. As shown in [25], the value of Psuccess is upper
bounded by 1/g2, and we choose the value Psuccess = 1/g2 to
optimize the performance of the modified four-state CVQKD
protocol.
The numerical simulations of Rgtot(α, T, ǫ) and R(α, T, ǫ)
with the same channel parameters T and ǫ is shown in Fig. 3,
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FIG. 3: (color online) (a). The lower bound of secret key rate for the modified four-state CVQKD protocol with a NLA Rgtot(α,T, ǫ) and that of
the original protocol without a NLA R(α, T, ǫ) against the transmission distance in km. (b). The lower bound of secret key rate for the modified
four-state CVQKD protocol with a NLA Rgtot(α,T, ǫ) and that of the original protocol without a NLA R(α,T, ǫ) against the losses in dB. In the
simulations, VA = 2α2 = 0.25, ǫ = 0.002, β = 0.8, g = 4, and Psuccess = 1/g2.
where the amplitude gain of the NLA is g = 4 and the ex-
cess noise is ǫ = 0.002. Similar to the results in [25], one
can find that the maximum admissible losses is increased by
20 log10 g by using a NLA with gain g, which is equivalent to
increase the maximum transmission distance by 20 log10 g0.2 km
in fiber channel. This result does not depends on the value
of Psuccess. Even for a more realistic probability of success,
the NLA increase the maximum transmission distance in the
same way. To test the efficiency for different values of g, the
secret key rate for the modified four-state CVQKD protocol
with a NLA with gain g = 2, 3, 4 is compared with that of the
original protocol, as shown in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 4: (color online) The lower bound of the secret key rate for the
modified four-state CVQKD protocol with a NLA Rgtot(α, T, ǫ) for
g = 2, 3, 4 and that of the original protocol without a NLA R(α,T, ǫ)
against the losses in dB. In the simulations, VA = 2α2 = 0.25, ǫ =
0.002, β = 0.8, and Psuccess = 1/g2.
The maximal tolerable excess noise ǫmax for the modified
four-state CVQKD protocol by using a NLA with gain g and
that of the original protocol is shown in Fig. 5. By using a
NLA, the maximal tolerable excess noise can be increased,
and this result does not depend on the value of Psuccess.
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FIG. 5: (color online) Maximal excess noise for the modified and
original four-state CVQKD protocol against losses in dB. In the sim-
ulations, VA = 2α2 = 0.25, β = 0.8, g = 4, and Psuccess = 1/g2.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a modified four-state CVQKD protocol is pro-
posed. The maximum transmission distance can be increased
by the equivalent of 20 log10 g dB of losses by using a noise-
less linear amplifier before Bob’s detection. The modified pro-
tocol is also more robust against excess noise.
Steady progress on the experimental realization of the NLA
has been made in recent years [27–31]. A further work would
be analyzing the gaps between practical implementations and
theoretical description of NLA, and the effect of the imperfec-
tion on the secure key rate.
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